Looking For a New Map

This is Part I of a multi-part series on some suggestions on how to transform the Democratic party and recover its majority. Three articles in the latest American Prospect (by Michael Lind, John Judis & Ruy Teixeira, and David Sirota) present three very different analyses of the Democrats' current situation and how to improve it. At the end I'm going to try and synthesize them and come to some general conclusions.

Today I'm going to take a look at Michael Lind's piece, Mapquest.com. Lucky for me, it is available at the New America Foundation webpage, if you don't subscribe to the Prospect (and if you don't, shame on you!).

Lind argues that the Democrats have become far too dependent on Greater New England, which he defines as the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Pacific Northwest. This region has been the political base of four minority parties: the Federalists, the Whigs, the post-Depression Republicans, and the post-Vietnam Democrats. It is no accident that these parties were in the minority, because they shared the region's political culture: pacifist, elitist, and reformist. These three political positions (particularly the first two) are unpopular in the country at large. So it is no surprise that today's Dems are in the minority, and they will continue to be so as long as they rely on this marginal part of the country.

The answer, of course, is to break out the regional ghetto and go national. The Democrats need to return to the tradition of regional parties, with a renewed emphasis on the Midwest, which intersects New England, Western, and Southern Culture. In doing this, Democrats would be following the Lincoln strategy, the only time a New England party was in the majority. Furthermore, the Democrat must abandon the cultural litmus test (abortion, gay rights, etc.) and focus instead on economic valence issues. The Democrats are not going to win over the hard-core religious right, but they might persuade moderate traditionalists. Finally, the Dems need to not just nominate Presidential candidates from the Midwest, they need to embrace a progressive version of Bush's universal capitalism, which has the potential for great appeal in red-state suburban regions.

Okay, what should we make of this piece? I generally like Lind's work: it is interesting even when I disagree with it. This article is no exception. Emphasizing the Midwest as a target region and emphasizing economics rather than culture seem like perfectly sensible strategies to me (a strategy that will come up several times in the next couple of days). I am intrigued, although I have some reservations, about using economic empowerment as a way to win in the suburbs. I also like Lind's development of the Lincoln analogy, pointing out old Abe's populist roots. Something like a modern Homestead Act is worthy of consideration.

But I do think Lind's piece has a variety of problems, some pedantic and some not. First, his definition of Great New England is a little strange. Why include the Great Lakes, which is the very region he wants to target? Unless he is just referring to the Upper Midwest (Minnesota, Wisconsin). More bothersome, his reading of American History is a bit odd. When Lind describes the "New England" parties, he is describing brands of New England Conservatism, which was nationalistic, pro-corporate, anti-slavery, and socially conservative. They old New England Federalists, with their elitist, pro-business, pro-Protestant ideology have just as much in common with today's Republicans than today's Democrats.

I have more substantive problems with Lind's article, however. First, it is a bit ridiculous to condemn the Democrats for their marginal regionalism, but not the Republicans. The Republicans, after all, are totally dependent on the South. If there has ever been an out-of-the-mainstream part of the country, it is certainly Dixie. As Kevin Phillips has pointed out, the Democrats have a northern strategy, just as the Republicans have a southern one. And given the closeness of recent elections, I don't see why the Democrats are as doomed to obsolescence as Lind suggests.

Second, I am surprised at Lind's ready dismissal of Democratic strength among minorities. In his piece, he says that Democrats won only in Greater New England, and in cities with large numbers of blacks and hispanics. Given the latter's growing share of the U.S. population, this is a pretty big thing to exclude. If you include ethnic minorities into the Democratic coalition, you start transcending the "Greater New England" definition of liberalism, which undercuts Lind's thesis.

Finally, Lind appears to fall into the same trap that the DLC has. He suggests that Democrats have a cultural litmus test. This is just GOP propaganda. There are plenty of anti-choice, pro-gun, anti-gay marriage Democrats. In fact, the last 2 Senate leaders have fit this profile. And if you are talking about the Presidential level, where certainly no candidate could get the Democratic nomination without being pro-choice, can I please ask you the last time a pro-choice Republican was nominated? That's what I thought. Lind appears conflicted, as many people are, between reaching out to red-staters (by blurring differences on culture) with not giving in on core Democratic principles (because it makes us look weak). I have yet to see any concrete suggestions on how we can thread that needle.

So overall I think that the Democrats are stronger than Lind argues, but that there strategic problems are more complicated than Lind suggests. We'll see.