<$BlogRSDUrl$>                                                                                                                                                                   
The Third Estate
What Is The Third Estate?
 Everything
What Has It Been Until Now In The Political Order?
Nothing
What Does It Want To Be?
Something

Why Lying is Wrong

Monday, January 10, 2005
Matt Yglesias is in a quandry. He can't seem to explain why lying is wrong. He is not referring to the question of personal morality, but to the problem of political ethics. Cavour said famously "if we did for ourselves what we did for our country, what scoundrels we'd be." The idea is that there is a separate set of ethics for those in a position of political power, that personal and political ethics are just different.

This is a very interesting question, and one that I have spent a lot of time thinking about. Questions of personal ethics are notoriously complicated because there are so many competing considerations and so many conflicting traditions. And applying a standard of personal ethics to politics is usually a mistake. Whether someone is a "good man" may have nothing to do with their effectiveness as a leader. Political ethics is primarily focused on the question of responsibility - we are responsible for what happens to others in a much more profound way when we are in a position of political power than when we are just private citizens.

I would contend that lying remains wrong whether we are referring to private or personal ethics, although for slightly different reasons. There are a variety of reasons for condemning deceit in private matters, the most persuasive of which is the Kantian argument: when you lie to (or manipulate) someone you are depriving them of free choice and are treating them as a means rather than an end. You are reducing your fellow man to a "thing."

Given the almost inevitable utilitarian calculus that comes into any political decision, political leaders are very tempted to treat their constituents are objects rather than subjects. After all, it's not like they really know them. So the Kantian argument (at least in the form I presented it) is inappropriate for political ethics.

So does this make lying okay? No. In a democracy, the leadership is elected by the people, who therefore require sufficient insight into the actions and motivations of their leaders in order to evaluate them. If you lie to your constituents, either as to what you are doing or why you are doing it, you are depriving them of the information they need to judge your worthiness for re-election. So lying to your constituents about political matters (rather than one's personal behavior) remains a moral wrong because it undermines the democratic process and vitiates republican accountability. I think a version of the Kantian ethic still holds, that lying is wrong because it deprives the one lied to of free choice.

The anti-Republican syllogism therefore retains its truth and its validity: Liars are bad, Republicans are liars, therefore Republicans are bad, QED.
Posted by Arbitrista @ 7:32 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home

:: permalink